This paper reviews the effects of trade liberalisation on wages in developing countries, and presents new evidence for Brazil. Wages fell substantially in the traded sector after trade liberalisation, consistent with there being reduced rents as industries faced greater competition. After trade liberalisation there was an increase in the marginal returns to college education. Within the traded sector, the impact of increasing openness on wages was insignificant for those in the top two education groups but negative for lower level education groups. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that imported technology raised the relative demand for highly skilled labour.
It is widely maintained that one of the causes of the growth of wage inequality in many industrialised countries is a change in the relative demand for skilled workers (Freeman, 1995; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; De Santis, 2002; Acemoglu, 2003) . There is little agreement, however, about the underlying causes of the change in the structure of labour demand. Some empirical evidence shows a relationship between an increase in international trade, wage dispersion and the level of employment, which has led a number of economists to conclude that recent internationalisation of economies has contributed to the increase in the dispersion of wages and unemployment (Sachs and Shatz, 1994; Leamer, 1996; Baldwin and Cain, 2000; Haskel and Slaughter, 2001 ). This proposition is sustained by the theorems of Heckscher and Ohlin and Stolper and Samuelson (HO/ SS). In contrast, other economists have found that technological change, rather than trade, has had the strongest impact on the structure of labour demand, since it is labour saving, especially of less-skilled labour (Berman et al., 1994 (Berman et al., , 1998 Desjonqueres et al., 1999) . 1 While both of these perspectives also have a bearing on the relationship between trade liberalisation and the distribution of wages in developing countries, the experience of developing countries has received much less attention than that of the industrialised world. To be consistent with the HO/SS model, it has been generally assumed that the impact of trade liberalisation in developing countries is the opposite of that in developed countries (Balassa, 1988; Wood, 1994; Cline, 1997) . According to this view, rising import competition as a result of increasing North-South trade in industries that intensively use less-educated labour is thought to herald an improvement in the income distribution in developing countries.
However, the experience of trade liberalisation in developing countries has been quite varied, and understanding the effects of increasing openness on their wage structures is a complex task. Some recent empirical studies show that trade liberalisation can be associated with an increase in the returns to higher levels of education, similar to that observed in some developed countries. These studies are reviewed in Section 1 of the paper. To the extent that developing countries have an abundance of unskilled labour, this result is puzzling and contradicts the standard theory of international trade which asserts that developing countries should specialise in the production of goods intensive in unskilled labour, thus increasing the relative demand for this factor and reducing the skilled wage premium. This finding therefore casts doubt on the relevance of the standard theory of international trade in explaining the impact of trade liberalisation in developing countries, at least in the short term.
The hypotheses which attempt to explain the unexpected worsening of the wage distribution in some developing countries following trade liberalisation are comparatively new. The explanations are still preliminary and partial, but they suggest that trade liberalisation releases a simultaneous process of technological modernisation and increasing capital, which together produce an increase in demand for highly skilled labour. An examination of these new hypotheses in the light of existing empirical evidence is presented in Section 2.
In order to demonstrate the role that can be played by these new hypotheses, Section 3 presents new evidence on the impact of trade liberalisation on wages and the returns to skills in a large developing country, namely Brazil. For a number of reasons, Brazil is particularly well suited to the purpose of gaining a better understanding of the link between trade liberalisation and wages. First, one of the major features of the Brazilian labour market is its wide wage and income distribution -indeed, Brazil is consistently ranked amongst the most unequal countries in the world (Li et al., 1998) .
2 Second, trade reform took place over a relatively short period of time at the beginning of the 1990s and the reductions in trade protection were widespread and substantial. Third, Brazil benefits from the availability of a long and reliable series of individual-level data covering the periods before, during and after trade liberalisation. In other countries where the issue of trade and inequality has been investigated, the available individual-level data are typically much less comprehensive. Finally, Brazil's case is of particular interest because, at least from the point of view of the average worker, Brazil remains thoroughly rooted in the developing world. Unlike in Mexico and Chile where increases in wage inequality were accompanied by generally strong labour demand and consequent wage rises, average real wages in Brazil have remained largely stable since 1980 (Green et al., 2001) .
Our findings are consistent with theories which imply that trade liberalisation unleashes a period of intensified competition and technical innovation that is complementary with high-level skilled labour. Trade and technology are thus intimately linked as sources of change in wages in the case of developing countries.
Trade Liberalisation and the Distribution of Income

Basic Theory
Starting from the Hecksher-Ohlin model, the theorem of Stolper and Samuelson (SS) was the first theoretical formulation to explain the effects of free trade on income distribution among productive factors. The basic SS result is that protectionism increases the relative return to the scarce factor -labour in developed countries and capital in developing countries. Hence, developing countries which introduce programmes of trade liberalisation should experience a rise in the relative return to labour, since they are relatively abundant in labour (and scarce in capital), and a narrowing of the distribution of income. The opposite should happen in developed countries, since they are relatively abundant in capital. The crucial feature of the standard theory is the correspondence between product prices and factor prices. This implies that an increase in the relative price of a good results in an increase of the relative return of the factor used intensively to produce that good.
An extension to the above analysis considers capital, skilled and unskilled labour as the relevant factors of production. The theoretical justification for this is the assumption of complementarity of capital and skilled labour, as originally proposed by Rosen (1968) and Griliches (1969) and recently explored by Goldin and Katz (1998) and Krusell et al. (2000) among others. Unskilled labour is presumed to be the abundant factor in developing countries. Hence the prediction of the theory is that the returns to unskilled labour should increase following trade liberalisation.
Empirical Evidence for Developing Countries
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Early trade liberalisations in the East Asian newly-industrialised economies took place against a backdrop of rapid growth. Later, following the instability of the international economy in the late 1970s/early 1980s, several developing countries adopted major economic reforms including trade liberalisation but also involving privatisation of state enterprises, deregulation of financial and capital markets, as well as product and labour markets, together with wide reform of the State. Prior to liberalisation, many developing countries had followed strong import substitution industrialisation strategies. All of these shocks generated rapid and extensive changes in their economies.
Increasing openness is likely to be associated, not only with increasingly competitive product markets in previously protected industries but also with technological change. Innovations originate in developed countries where incentives exist for their application, diffusion and propagation (Lucas, 1990; Stokey, 1991; Young, 1991) and the literature normally presumes some role for technological change in explaining the widening of the income distribution in developed countries (Acemoglu, 2002) . Some developing countries, partly because they receive substantial amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI), have also experienced extremely rapid technological modernisation with significant productivity increases (e.g. Brazil, China, India and South Korea), though they tend to import rather than to create these new technologies. Because of its largely foreign origins, the impact of technology on the labour markets of developing countries may follow a rather different pattern from that of developed countries.
The experience of the East Asian newly-industrialised economies was a reduction in wage inequality after openness with a strong export-orientation was introduced in the 1960s and 1970s. This was therefore consistent with standard trade theory which predicts that trade liberalisation should benefit the locally abundant factor (Wood, 1994 (Wood, , 1999 Krueger, 1983 Krueger, , 1990 . However, the generality of this optimistic outcome is being challenged by a number of studies for countries that opened up to trade more recently. Robbins (1994) , for example, examines the changes in the structure of wages after trade liberalisation in Chile and finds that, although the content of skilled labour in imports exceeds the content in exports, the returns to skilled labour grew following liberalisation.
4 Robbins and Gindling (1999) investigate the changes in relative wages and in the supply and demand for skilled labour in Costa Rica before and after trade liberalisation. They find that the skill premium rose after liberalisation as a result of changes in the structure of labour demand. Beyer et al. (1999) use a time series approach and find a long-term correlation between openness and wage inequality in Chile. Hanson and Harrison (1999) examine the changes in both wages and employment of skilled and unskilled workers after trade liberalisation in Mexico. They find little variation in employment levels but a significant increase in skilled workers' relative wages. However, no correlation is found between the intensity of skilled labour and changes in relative product prices, as suggested by the SS model. They also show that foreign companies and those heavily involved in export markets pay higher wages to skilled labour. Feliciano (2001) and Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) find that the increase in the returns to education in Mexico contributed to the rise of relative wages of skilled workers. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) show that the American 'maquiladoras' in the north of Mexico caused a significant increase in the relative demand for skilled workers in the border region with the US, where there is a high concentration of FDI. They decompose the increase in demand for skilled labour and find that, as in developed countries, most of the change in the structure of demand is explained by intra-industry variations, that is to say, it is associated with the introduction of technologies that require skilled labour. Finally, for Brazil, Green et al. (2001) find an increase in the returns to college education following trade liberalisation and attribute this to rising relative demand for college-educated workers. However, contrary to studies for other developing countries, there was no apparent change in overall wage inequality.
Thus, the evidence on trade liberalisations which have been implemented in the last two decades (mainly, but not exclusively, for Latin America) suggests a positive relationship between trade liberalisation and wage inequality. This finding is clearly contrary to the predictions of the traditional theory of international trade. In the next Section, we therefore present a number of alternative hypotheses that try to explain increasing wage inequality in developing countries following trade liberalisation.
Trade Liberalisation and Wage Inequality in Developing Countries: Alternative Explanations
Capital, Technology and Skilled Labour
The most immediate effect of trade liberalisation is a reduction in the extent to which domestic manufacturers can operate in protected markets. The reduction or elimination of trade barriers and tariffs combine to turn any markets that were previously highly imperfect into markets that are now more contestable, and hence generate lower prices and reduced producer rents. To the extent that such rents were previously shared with employees, wages will also fall after trade liberalisation. Other changes in the wage structure would also be expected as resources shift between industries.
An additional effect of trade liberalisation is a rapid inflow of foreign technology as a result of both FDI and increased imports. The technologies being introduced through FDI include new management practices and new forms of work organisation. The in-flowing technology is assumed to be skill-biased because it is mainly designed in the industrialised world which is skill intensive and, a fortiori, because new technology is skill-biased within the industrialised world (Berman et al., 1998) . The incorporation of new technologies will therefore be accompanied by a change in labour demand in favour of skilled workers. If large enough, this shift can outweigh the reduction in the demand for skilled labour that is predicted by traditional trade theory. Robbins (1996) has termed the effect of the in-flowing technology resulting from trade liberalisation the 'skill-enhancing trade hypothesis'. Where the gap between existing and newly imported technology is large, trade reform could have an even greater effect on skill demand in a developing country than it does in an industrialised country (O'Connor and Lunati, 1999) .
A variation on this theme is the conjecture that, even if the technology to be transferred is neutral, the transitional process of transferring and installing new technologies may be skill-biased (Pissarides, 1997) . In this case, the effect on the returns to human capital will be temporary and skilled workers benefit only during the transition period to the new, higher, technological level. Goldin and Katz (1998) reach a similar conclusion. They argue that the demand for skilled workers
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can follow a technological cycle. The demand rises when new technologies and machinery are introduced but it declines once the other workers have learned to use the new equipment. These theories predict that the effect of the increase in the relative demand for skilled labour will be to increase the relative wages and thus increase inequality. The magnitude of the effect will vary according to the elasticities of supply of skilled and unskilled labour, and the elasticity of substitution.
Other Possible Explanations
Alternative approaches to understanding rising wage inequality following trade liberalisation in developing countries involve various modifications to the basic HO/SS framework, while maintaining the central idea that the returns to factors of production are conditional on their relative distribution among countries. Thus, Davis (1996) presents a model in which the central hypothesis is that the availability of a country's factors of production should be assessed in relation to a group of countries with similar endowments, rather than in relation to the wider international economy. Thus, the availability of factors should be considered from a relative, and not from an absolute, perspective.
5 What matters in the model is the relative position of the country amongst the other countries within its own cone.
Davis proposes a simplified model with only two cones of production diversification, one for developed countries and the other for developing countries. The countries of each cone produce goods that are not produced in the countries of the other cone. Each cone comprises countries with similar but not identical factors endowments. This gives each country a different comparative advantage inside its cone, leading to a specialisation of production. In this framework, trade liberalisation can raise the demand for skilled labour in a developing country as long as among the countries of its cone, it has a relatively high supply of skilled labour. On the other hand, a country from a cone where there is a greater supply of unskilled labour can experience a reduction in wage inequality. The reduction of the prices of products produced in the other cone (developed countries) has no effect on the prices of the factors of production in developing countries, since they do not produce the same goods. Wood (1999) argues that the entry of countries like China, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia in the world market for goods with a high content of unskilled labour in the mid-1980s had an important impact on income inequality of middle income countries, particularly those in Latin America. His argument is that the increased supply of unskilled labour-intensive goods changed the structure of supply of goods in the world market, reducing their prices and the return to factors involved in the production of such goods. This harmed the countries which had some comparative advantage in their production. As a consequence, these countries would have been pressured to change their production techniques in a search for comparative advantage in the production of goods which use semiskilled labour, resulting in an increase in the demand for this type of worker and therefore causing a rise in wage dispersion in these countries. Feenstra and Hanson (1995) develop a model that shows that the increase in wage inequality in developed and developing countries is consistent with capital flow from advanced to developing countries. The idea is that the flow of FDI changes the structure of production and increases the stock of capital of developing countries. This can have significant effects on the level and profile of investment and in the technologies available locally. The model assumes the production of a simple final good that requires a continuum of intermediary goods with varying proportions of skilled and unskilled labour. The costs of production for some phases of the final good are smaller for developing countries than for developed countries. Assuming that capital returns are higher in developing countries, as soon as they open their economies up to trade, there will be a transfer of capital from developed to developing countries. The model suggests that the stages of production which demand less skilled labour (by the measure of the advanced country) will be transferred to the less developed countries where unskilled labour is relatively cheaper. However, the kind of labour that is actually demanded is skilled when judged from the perspective of the developing countries. The specialisation of production increases the average skill requirements of labour in both sets of countries. As a result, the relative demand for skilled labour increases in both regions and thus causes rising wage inequality in both developed and developing countries.
The common theme of these alternative explanations is that it may not be valid to assume that the impact of trade liberalisation on developing countries will be symmetrically opposite to its impact in developed countries. It follows that whatever the empirical evidence informs us about the effects of trade liberalisation in developing countries, the conclusions should not necessarily be used to alter our perceptions about the drivers of the change in wage inequality in the developed world. Nevertheless, the impact of openness on wages in less developed countries is a subject of great importance in its own right. Notwithstanding the studies reviewed above, there remain important questions as to how far the conjecture that trade liberalisation may enhance skill demands can be generalised. It is also of interest to examine the extent to which trade liberalisation leads to an overall wage reduction for all workers in the traded sector (as a consequence of the assumed fall in producer rents) and then how far such a reduction spills over into the nontraded sector. To address these issues, we present some new evidence regarding the impact of trade liberalisation in Brazil.
Trade Liberalisation and the Wage Distribution in Brazil
Brazil is, first of all, a useful arena to investigate hypotheses about changing skill demands in the developing world because it is a very substantial economy in its own right. Moreover, the period of trade liberalisation can be identified fairly precisely in Brazil. Prior to 1990, the Brazilian economy was highly protected and regulated, and public sector companies dominated a variety of infrastructure activities and other industries. Successive administrations had followed a vigorous import substitution industrialisation strategy aimed at protecting the domestic market. Trade barriers were expanded through tariffs, import licences, different exchange rate regimes for imports and exports and other measures, such as taxes and subsidies. More than half of all industrial products were in the 'Anexo C', a list of items that could not be imported. Such policies left Brazil an especially closed economy by the end of the 1980s.
Some modest reduction in tariffs and the lifting of some redundant barriers commenced in 1988. However, the major break with the import substitution strategy began in 1990, under the incoming President Collor administration, when efforts to contain inflation were combined with drastic trade liberalisation. The new government introduced a four-year schedule to reduce the degree of protection but, in practice, it was completed in only three years. By the middle of 1993, most of the complex and bureaucratic non-tariff barriers had been removed and a new tariff structure was imposed which substantially reduced the degree of protectionism.
In 1987, the weighted average nominal tariff was 55%; by 1992 it had been reduced to 14%. This was accompanied by a sharp reduction in the range of tariffs, reducing the standard deviation to about one third of the previous figure. The weighted average effective tariff, 6 which remained largely unchanged in the 1980s, dropped from 68% in 1987, to 18% in 1992, while the standard deviation declined from 54% to 17% (Kume et al., 2003) . While these tariff reductions were not severe by international standards, the removal of the non-tariff barriers shifted the pattern of protection. The new policy was extremely significant, especially for the manufacturing sector, and signalled that the long period of protectionism was at an end. Trade intensity rose accordingly, with imports increasing by 257% and exports by 151%, between 1990 and 1996.
Data and Methodology
Our main data source, the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD), is a series of nationally representative cross-section household surveys which have been carried out every year since 1976, excepting 1980, 1991, 1994 and 2000. 7 They are conducted using a consistent methodology by the government's statistical agency, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). We use data from 1981 to 1999, during which time a consistent education classification is available, and thus giving a series of nearly a decade each side of the initiation of trade reform. Each PNAD contains data on roughly 350,000 individuals in about 100,000 randomly selected households, following face-to-face interviews conducted in the 6 The computation of 'effective tariffs' includes the tariff of the good itself and the tariffs of all intermediate goods employed in its production; for more details, see Corden (1974) and Kume et al. (2003) . Thus, the 'effective tariff' (also termed the 'effective rate of protection') more appropriately measures the degree of protection than the nominal tariff. 7 In 1980, 1991 and 2000 there were national censuses. In 1994, the survey was cancelled due to a shortage of funds.
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[ F E B R U A R Y third week of September. We restrict our analysis to employed individuals earning a positive wage, aged between 18 and 65 inclusive. This yields an average of almost 125,000 individuals per annum and, across the 17 PNADs that we utilise, a total of over 2 million observations. We compute the hourly wage as monthly pay at the time of interview in the respondent's main job divided by weekly hours multiplied by 4.33; to obtain real hourly wages we deflate hourly wages by the CPI in September in each year, based in 1998 reals. Although the quality of PNAD data is known to be high (Sawyer, 1988) , as a further precaution we eliminate outliers that might be due to measurement or misreporting error by trimming the top and bottom of the real wage distribution by 0.1%.
The basic education variable gives the number of years of completed education, which is then used to classify education into six levels: We define (potential) work experience in the conventional way as age minus years of schooling minus six. However, this measure can be problematic in Brazil and in developing countries in general. Firstly, some adults have such a low level of schooling (including many with zero schooling) that they are effectively given credit for labour market experience from a very young age. Secondly, grade attainment can be an imperfect indicator of the number of years of schooling given the high rates of grade repetition in Brazil. Hence we also consider results in which we use age (and age-squared) rather than experience (and experiencesquared) in our earnings functions, since age is not affected by these considerations.
In order to focus on the impact of trade on wages, we match the PNAD data at the two-digit industry level with data on the effective rate of protection taken from Kume et al. (2003) . We are able to use a two-digit classification, comprising 31 industries, of which 20 are in the traded-goods sector and 11 in the non-traded sector. The allocation of industries to the traded and non-traded sectors is presented in the Appendix Table. 3.2. Trade Liberalisation and Wage Distribution in Brazil Our aim in this Section is to present a picture of how the episode of trade liberalisation that began around 1990 affected the level and structure of real wages in Brazil. We begin with descriptions of the movements of wages over time, before presenting more formal estimates derived from earnings functions. Figure 1 shows that across the whole of the period, the average real hourly wage was almost unchanged: it was 2.81 reals in 1981 and 2.83 reais in 1999.
9 However, the mean wage disguises movements in the ratio of traded to non-traded sector wages. This ratio was fairly constant throughout the 1980s but fell from 0.74 in 1992 to 0.69 in 1995 and still further to 0.65 by 1999.
10 This fall in the raw traded to non-traded sector wage differential is a first piece of evidence consistent with the idea that increased competition in the traded sector may have led to a reduction of rents in that sector following trade reform.
It is also apparent from Figure 1 that there is a degree of cyclicality in real wages over the period under consideration. In order to smooth these across the cycle, we average real wages in the traded and non-traded sectors in the period prior to 1990 (i.e. 1981-90, hereafter 'pre-liberalisation') and the period after 1992 (i.e. 1992-9, hereafter 'post-liberalisation'). The results of this exercise are shown in Table 1 (a). The near constancy of aggregate real wages across the two sub-periods masks falling average wages in the traded and non-traded sectors, by 6.6% and 1.9% respectively. This apparent paradox arises because the fall in wages has been accompanied by a proportionate shift in the composition of employment from the 9 All the statistics in this sub-section are weighted by the PNAD sample weights which are computed so as to ensure that the sample reflects the Brazilian population as a whole. However, the weighted and unweighted means are very similar. The 'blip' in 1986, known as the 'Plano Cruzado' effect, is genuine. It resulted from a wage and price freeze programme, which allowed wages to rise 8% faster than prices. 10 As we shall see, most of the wage differential between the non-traded and traded sectors is attributable to differences in average education levels between the two sectors. Non-traded industries also include the public sector which pays especially high wages in Brazil. Both sectors include substantial proportions of informal workers.
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traded to the non-traded sector as shown in Table 1 (b), with the result that average real wages are almost unchanged. Movements in the dispersion of wages are shown in Table 1 (c). Wages are marginally more unequally distributed in the traded sector both pre and postliberalisation, and there were (small) falls in dispersion in both sectors. A similar conclusion is reached when we examine the dispersion of wages with alternative measures of inequality (Green et al., 2001) : the high level of wage inequality in Brazil changed very little during this period.
Of course, movements in average wages and sectoral wage differentials can occur for a number of reasons in addition to any impact of trade liberalisation. Perhaps the most pertinent during the period under investigation are the significant changes in the education and gender composition of the workforce. Average years of schooling increased steadily from 4.91 years in 1981 to 6.85 years by 1999. In the same period the proportion of employees who are female increased from 29% to almost 38%.
11 The non-traded sector has a significantly higher proportion of workers who are female -increasing from 36% to 44% over the period 1981 to Note: Real wages in 1998 reals.
11 There was a steady change in the raw gender wage gap over the whole period, with the ratio of female to male wages increasing from 70% in 1981 to 85% in 1999; see Green et al. (2001) 
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1999, while in the traded sector, the share rose more gradually, from 20% to 24%. The averages across the pre and post-liberalisation eras between the sectors are presented in Table 1(d). There are also substantial differences in the educational composition of employment by sector. Table 2(a) reveals that the non-traded sector is relatively highly educated as compared to the traded sector, employing a much greater share of more educated workers both pre and post-liberalisation. Averaged over the whole period, a quarter of workers in the traded sector had less than one year of education. Associated with these differently educated individuals, Table 2(b) presents the data on wages in the traded and non-traded sectors pre and post-liberalisation. There is a steeper profile of wages across education groups in the traded 
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sector -less educated workers received lower wages and more educated workers receive higher wages than their counterparts in the non-traded industries and this was the case pre and post-liberalisation. However, accompanying this pattern, and corresponding to the statistics in Table 1 (a), there is a fall in average hourly wages in every education category over time (with the single exception of level 1 educated workers in the non-traded industries).
To disentangle the multifarious changes in the composition of employment over time and their impact on wages separate from any impact attributable to trade liberalisation requires a multivariate approach. We estimate standard Mincerian earnings functions, in which we regress log real wages on a number of personal characteristics, together with indicators of broad industrial sector and trade liberalisation. In order to investigate the consequences of trade liberalisation on wages, we follow two strategies. First we follow a before-after methodology and examine shifts in the wage structure before and after the onset of trade liberalisation. While this has the virtue of simplicity, it may obscure the changing impact of trade liberalisation over time. Thus in our second strategy, we allow for a different intensity and timing in the process of liberalisation across the traded sector, by specifying an industry-level time-dependent index of openness.
Hence, to begin with we create a simple (0,1) dummy ('post-lib') which takes a value of 1 for the period after liberalisation. We define this to be from 1992 onwards since the non-tariff barriers were dropped substantially after 1990 and most of the reduction in tariffs had taken place by 1992. We examine the impact of liberalisation separately for the traded and non-traded workers by creating the appropriate interactions.
Column (1) of Table 3 (a) presents a simple OLS regression which decomposes the mean (log) wage between sectors (tradable vs non-tradable) while column (2) distinguishes both between sectors and trade regime (pre-lib and post-lib) . This shows that, on average, workers in the traded sector were paid 29% 12 less than workers in the non-traded sector pre-liberalisation. As anticipated from Figure 1 , in the post-liberalisation period average wages in the traded sector fell relative to those in the non-traded sector.
A standard Mincerian earnings function is presented in column (3) of Table 3 (a). The coefficient estimates appear plausible; there is a hump-shaped experience-earnings profile with a peak at around 40 years of experience, women earn significantly less than equivalently experienced and qualified men, and the returns to education are monotonically increasing in education level.
13 Holding a work card (which indicates that this is a formal sector job) is associated with about 21% higher wages. Moreover, as discussed above, the returns to education in Brazil are very high. The wage equation explains a relatively high proportion (45%) of the total variation in earnings between individuals. A comparison of columns (2) and (3) reveals that, although average wages are lower in the traded sector, much 12 Computed as [exp(b) ) 1] · 100, where b is the coefficient on the traded dummy variable. 13 The phrase 'return' is potentially misleading, as the calculation is strictly speaking not a return to education investment. We simply reflect conventional terminology in using the phrase. No calculation of lost wages or other education costs is included, and it is implicitly assumed that the length of time required to complete each education level remains stable throughout the period.
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Trade Liberalisation and the Returns to Education: 1981-99 Notes: Heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
of this is due to the lower human capital in that sector as revealed in Table 2 (a). In the pre-liberalisation period, workers in the traded sector were paid only [exp()0.079))1 ¼ ] 7.6% less than similar workers in the non-traded sector once experience, gender composition and, in particular, education attainment are controlled for. Post-liberalisation, wages in both sectors fell significantly after controlling for the increases in education level and changes in other factors. Allowing for education and other changes, wages in the non-traded sector fell 8.1% while those in the traded sector fell 15.9% and hence the wage disadvantage of working in the traded sector widened from 7.6% to 15.4%. 14 This is prima facie evidence that trade liberalisation impacted on wages and in both sectors in Brazil.
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One possible explanation of this result is the fall in rents and the reduction in the bargaining power of unions in industries most affected by trade (Hay, 2001; Arbache, 2000) . Nevertheless, other factors may also account for the movement in wages between the two sectors after 1992. For example, privatisations and deregulation of industries, which became more prominent in the latter part of the 1990s, could have had an effect on wages in both sectors.
Column (4) of Table 3 (a) presents the same specification but substituting age for experience, given the problems noted above in measuring potential experience in developing countries. The results are very similar to those in column (3). The age-earnings profile peaks at 49 years of age.
Column (5) presents the same specification but with the rates of return to age, work card and education being allowed to differ between men and women. Part of the lower wages that women earn is due to lower returns to age and, especially, educational attainment but the findings reported above for trade regime and sector are robust to relaxing the constraint that these returns are identical for men and women. Given that we are primarily concerned here with the differential returns in the traded and non-traded sector pre and post-liberalisation, we therefore constrain the rates of return by gender to be the same in what follows, while noting any sensitivity of our results to this restriction. 15 Agriculture, which accounts for approximately 18% of total employment (declining from 22% in 1981 to 14% in 1999) is included in the traded sector in the results presented. This large and important sector is very low paid and thus contributes disproportionately to lower wages in the traded sector. However, our major findings are not sensitive to the exclusion of this sector. The non-agricultural traded sector experienced a fall in (conditional) wages of 14.5% post-liberalisation (compared to a decrease of 15.9% when agriculture is included). Similarly, the decline in non-traded sector wages postliberalisation when agriculture is excluded from the traded sector is 8.3%, which is little different from the decrease of 8.1% when all industries are included in the analysis. 16 Since the OLS estimated returns may be biased by the potential endogeneity of schooling, a conventional response in the literature is to attempt to instrument educational attainment. We used spouse's education level, where available, as an instrument for own education and found a similar pattern of results to those presented in the paper. The exception was that the IV estimated returns to education were rather higher than the OLS estimates, as commonly found for other countries; see, for example, Card (2001) for a recent survey. However, given that the instrument is only available for around 60% of our sample members and the instrument failed the exclusion restriction test suggested by Bound et al. (1995) (consistent with the results in Lam and Schoeni (1993) , who found spouse and parental education were significant determinants of own wages in Brazil), we decided to proceed with the OLS estimates.
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[ Table 3 (b) focuses more explicitly on the returns to education pre and postliberalisation by allowing the estimated rates of return to differ between the two periods. This allows us to identify possible gainers and losers following trade liberalisation among workers with different education levels. Column (1) restricts the returns in the traded and non-traded sectors to be the same and simply differentiates the returns pre and post-liberalisation. Column (2) allows for the returns to be additionally differentiated in each sector as well as pre and post-liberalisation.
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A number of pertinent findings are apparent. First, the returns to education compared with level 1 are significantly lower in the post-liberalisation decade. This is also consistent with the increasing supply of more educated workers as noted above. Second, the marginal returns to education -comparing each education level with those of the one below -are greater pre-liberalisation than post liberalisation for every level up to high school graduation (level 4). The point estimate of the marginal return to graduating from college has risen from 121% to 137%. This finding corresponds well with the prediction of the 'skill-enhancing trade hypothesis'.
18 Note, however, that the hypothesis applies to college-educated labour in particular. This finding is similar to that reported in Green et al. (2001) , which indicated a sharp rise in the returns to college education post-1990, though here the focus is on comparing the whole post-liberalisation decade with the previous one. Green et al. (2001) show there that this rising return to college education could be interpreted as due to relative demand for college labour rising faster than its supply. Third, the returns to education are greater in the traded sector than the non-traded sector both before and after liberalisation. For example, the conditional log wage returns to level 3 (completed elementary education) compared with level 1 were (0.538 ) 0.054 ¼) 0.484 in the non-traded sector and (0.408 + 0.392 ¼) 0.800 in the traded sector. This result is similar to the unconditional wage-education link reported in Table 2 (b).
In the results presented in Table 3 , the liberalisation dummy simply records trade liberalisation as a 0-1 event, prior to 1990 ('before') and post-1992 ('after'). Apart from its simplicity, a major advantage of this approach is that it is possible to examine changes in the non-traded sector following the reform of the traded sector. However, there are two important disadvantages of this before-and-after approach. First, although reforms were concentrated in a period of a few years, one cannot be confident that the changes in the wage structure from one decade to the next can be attributed to the change in trade regime, rather than also to other (e.g. macroeconomic) phenomena. Second, in practice the trade reforms affected different industries to different degrees and at different times and the timing of any wage change would be expected to reflect that of the tariff changes for the particular industry concerned. However, the 0-1 liberalisation dummy does 17 While a number of parameterisations are possible, that presented in Table 3 (b) allows us to compare the returns to each education level directly in each regime.
18 After dividing by the number of years it takes to gain each qualification, these estimated marginal returns are higher than the returns to an extra year of education typically found in developed countries but are comparable with those found in developing countries, including Brazil (Lam and Schoeni, 1993) . not allow for the average impact of the change in trade regime to differ in the aggregate over time.
These drawbacks can be addressed in the following ways. First, the post-liberalisation period can be disaggregated in order to examine any differential effects of liberalisation over time. This reveals that the sharpest falls in (conditional) wages in both traded and non-traded sectors occurred in the immediate post-liberalisation period, with some recovery in both sectors towards the end of the 1990s -although wages do not return to their pre-liberalisation levels in either sector. This finding reflects the general trends in wages depicted in Figure 1 which is clearly, at least in part, related to the business cycle. However, the important finding for our investigation is that wages fell by more and bounced back much less in the traded sector than in the non-traded sector.
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In addition, we can investigate the stability of all the other parameters by estimating separate wage equations for each year. Taking the specification in Table 3 (a), column (3) as representative (although without the liberalisation effect which is now absorbed into the constant), the results of this exercise provide further confirmation of the broad findings presented above. 20 In general, the returns to experience and education are fairly stable over time. The exception is that there is some evidence of an increase in the college wage premium in the 1990s. However, the number of college-educated individuals is only ever a very small share of employment.
21 By far the most dramatic and significant change over time evident in the separate equations is the widening of the negative premium that accrues to those working in the traded sector. While there is some year-on-year variation -most probably reflecting domestic and international macroeconomic conditions, including exchange rate movements -the average negative premium is )7.4% for the years 1981-90, and )15.6% for 1992-9. These averages are remarkably similar to the )7.6% and )15.4% reported above when we pool the years together and thereby impose parameter constancy. This analysis is complemented by the second strategy described above which allows for the differential intensity and timing in the process of liberalisation in the different industries, rather than imposing a simple before-and-after indicator of 19 As an illustrative example, using the specification in Table 3 Thus, conditional wages fell by less in the period immediately following trade reform in the non-traded sector than in the traded sector. Moreover, more than two-thirds of the decline had been recovered in the non-traded sector by the end of the decade, compared to only a quarter in the traded sector. 20 These results are available from the authors on request. 21 Even by 1999, only 8% of the workforce is educated to this level; see Green et al. (2001) .
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[ In practice the 'openness' indicator ranged from 0.032 to 0.920 across trading industries in 1987 and from 0.246 to 1.024 in 1998. 23 The extremes in both years were the highly protected vehicles industry at the bottom end and the petroleum industry at the top end, which experienced some negative tariffs, that is, export subsidies. In fact, the petroleum industry remained largely open to the world market throughout the period, while most other industries were opened up at varying rates. The textiles industry was typical. It opened up in three stages, its openness index rising from 0.29 in 1987 to 0.43 in 1988, to 0.61 in 1990, then to 0.81 in 1993, where it hovered for the rest of the period. The vehicles and parts industry, by contrast, was completely closed in 1990, with an index of 0.02; it was opened up to 0.42 in 1993, 0.68 in 1994 and then tariffs were re-imposed; the index finished at 0.25 in 1998. The median level of openness peaked at 0.865 in 1995 and 1996. Table 4 presents the estimates of the differential impact of the reforms using a measure of the changing degree of openness in each traded industry. Column (1) reports the simple impact of this measure of the degree of openness on log real wages. In this and subsequent columns we control for sources of inter-industry wage variation by including a vector of 20 industry dummies, so that the openness indicator will pick up sources of variation over time which differ across industries. We also control for education, experience or age, work card and gender, using the standard earnings function. It is seen that greater openness is associated with lower wages. This finding supports the interpretation that wages fell most in those industries where openness increased the most. Once again, the magnitude of the effect of changing openness on wages is not affected by whether we control for experience, column (2) or age, column (3). Its value indicates that, ceteris paribus, a 10 percentage point fall in an industry's tariff rate (an increase in its openness), evaluated at the median value of openness in 1990, would have reduced wages in that industry by about 1.6%. Given that the average rate of effective protection fell by nearly 65 percentage points between 1987 and 1995, the downward impact on 22 While the effective rate of protection takes into account the tariffs on inputs as well as outputs, it does not take into account any non-tariff barriers and these were particularly significant in Brazil prior to the 1990s. The advantage of the effective rate of protection is that it provides an objective measure of the degree of openness to trade in different industries and over time. However, we acknowledge that changing non-tariff barriers may also have been important over the period. 23 Note that the sample period now runs from 1987 to 1998 due to data limitations.
wages within the traded sector of the trade reforms appears to be substantial. That real wages did not fall to this extent is due to the increasing educational attainment of the workforce during the period. Finally, the specification in column (4) of Table 4 includes interactions between the measure of openness and each of the different education levels, in order to ascertain whether the impact of greater openness is borne disproportionately by different education groups. It shows that greater openness is associated with significantly lower returns to the four lowest levels of education but not for either of the top two education levels.
Conclusions
Our review of the theoretical and empirical literature of the impact of trade liberalisation on the distribution of wages revealed that the effects may be ambiguous as soon as we move away from the confines of the traditional HO/SS theory. A range of recent theories allow for the possibility that trade liberalisation ushers in a period of skill-biased technical change within developing countries which, Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for potential inter-industry/year group correlation. Industry dummies are also included. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level unless otherwise indicated: *significant at 10%; significant at 5%; àinsignificantly different from zero at conventional levels.
depending on the relevant supply trends and supply elasticities, generates a period of changing relative wages. The predictions from increasing international trade for developing countries are therefore not simply the symmetric counterparts of those for the industrialised world. Accordingly, we have examined the experience of Brazil in some detail. Brazil is a large developing country which undertook a concentrated bout of trade reform in the early 1990s. The data show that wages tend to be lower in traded industries than in non-traded industries, mainly because the traded industries employ workers with lower average education. We have investigated both the returns to skill, which turned out to be relatively high in Brazil as previous studies have found, and their interaction with sectoral wage differences, on the grounds that trade reform is also likely to signal increased product and labour market competition, and therefore lower rents.
Our main conclusions in respect of trade liberalisation and wages in Brazil are:
(i) Overall, allowing for education and experience, wages in the traded sector were lowered substantially by increasing the degree of openness following liberalisation, consistent with the view that the reforms raised the degree of competition in traded industries and thereby reduced rents. Wages were also lowered (though by less) in the non-traded sector, indicating either a degree of spill-over, or the effects of other changes such as privatisation or deregulation that took place later in the 1990s. Nevertheless, since education levels also rose, the average economywide wage level barely changed over the 20 year period under investigation. (ii) The increasing openness had differential effects across education groups and within sectors. Across the whole economy, the marginal returns to education were lower in the post-liberalisation than the pre-liberalisation period, except for college-educated workers for whom the marginal return increased. Within the traded sector, increasing openness was associated with lower wages but the downward impact of openness on wages was insignificant at the highest two education levels.
These concluding results are consistent with the view that the technology introduced in Brazil after trade liberalisation, much of it transferred through capital imports and FDI, was largely skill-biased relative to the previously installed technology. The importance of this finding is in relation to the policy implications of future trade reforms in other countries. To the extent that they can be generalised to other developing economies at a broadly similar stage of development, they suggest that trade reforms generate reductions in rents where they exist (and hence wage reductions), while highly educated workers are likely to be protected by an increasing demand for their expertise in transferring and utilising incoming technology.
